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Abstract
This paper constructs a model of a supply chain to examine how demand volatility
is passed upstream through the chain. In particular, we seek to determine how likely
it is that the chain experiences a bullwhip effect, where the variance of the upstream
firm’s production exceeds the variance of the downstream firm’s sales. We show that
the bullwhip effect is more likely to occur and is greater in size in supply chains in
which inventory control is centralized rather than decentralized, that is, exercised
by the downstream firm.
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1 Introduction
Inventory investment plays a crucial role in generating volatility in the out-
put of individual firms and, at the aggregate level, in international trade and
GNP.1 One of the reasons is that changes in inventory investment may am-
plify demand shocks so that the variance of production or trade may exceed
the variance of sales. This bullwhip effect, as it has become known in the op-
erations management literature, has been observed in various supply chains
and widely discussed in that literature at least since Forrester (1961).2 Fol-
lowing Metzler (1941), the bullwhip effect has also featured prominently in
the macroeconomic literature, where it has been shown that in many differ-
ent industries aggregate production is more volatile than aggregate sales.3
The bullwhip effect has also been invoked to explain why, during the recent
financial crisis, international trade proved to be more volatile than GDP in
the sense that the volume of trade dropped much more and much faster than
GDP but also recovered more quickly.4 In short, it is essential to understand
inventory investment, and the bullwhip effect in particular, if one wants to
understand the macroeconomics of business cycles, explain the volatility of
international trade relative to GDP, or devise strategies for supply chain
management (Blinder and Maccini, 1991, p.74; Cachon et al., 2007).
The current paper seeks to examine the microeconomic foundations of
the bullwhip effect by constructing a model to explore the conditions under
which this effect may arise from the inventory investment decisions of firms in
a simple supply chain consisting of an upstream firm (hereafter, for the sake
of concreteness, called the manufacturer) and a downstream firm (hereafter
called the retailer). In particular, we ask how the volatility of retail sales
and manufacturer production (or shipments), and thus the occurrence of the
1Blinder and Maccini (1991), for instance, find that 87% of the drop in GNP during the
average postwar recession in the United States was accounted for by the fall in inventory
investment.
2The term ’bullwhip effect’ first appears in the academic literature in Lee et al. (1997a,
b). Hammond (1994) observes an amplification of demand variability in the case of Barilla
pasta. Procter & Gamble found that "the diaper orders issued by the distributors have a
degree of variability that cannot be explained by consumer demand fluctuations alone."
(See Lee et al. 1997a, p.546). The bullwhip effect has also been observed at a soup
manufacturer (Lee et al., 1997b).
3The term bullwhip effect to describe the phenomenon where the variance of production
or trade exceeds the variance of sales has entered the economics literature more recently;
see, for instance, Zavacka (2012) and Altomonte et al. (2013). Elsewhere it has been
referred to as production counter-smoothing (Kahn, 1987).
Industry level evidence for the United States comes from Blinder and Maccini (1991)
for various industries, Blanchard (1983) and Kahn (1992) for the automotive industry,
Blinder (1981) for retailing, West (1986) for aggregate manufacturing, and more recently
from Wen (2005a). See Fair (1989) for evidence against the bullwhip effect in several
industries.
4See, for instance, Alessandria et al. (2011), Altomonte et al. (2013), and Novy and
Taylor (2014).
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bullwhip effect, depend on how inventory control is organized in the supply
chain. We compare two forms of organization: a vertically integrated supply
chain in which inventory control is centralized, and a decentralized supply
chain, in which inventory is controlled by the retailer.
Comparing how the bullwhip effect may evolve under different organiza-
tional forms is both theoretically interesting and empirically relevant. First,
the theoretical literature on vertical control of inventory shows that incen-
tives to invest in inventory and thus the size of inventory generally differ
between vertically integrated and decentralized supply chains (see Krishnan
and Winter (2007, 2010), and Qu et al. (2017)). Given this relationship
between inventory investment and the organization of the supply chain, it
seems pertinent to ask whether the volatilities of sales and production–and
thus the occurrence of the bullwhip effect–also differ depending on how the
supply chain is organized.
Second, several lines of empirical research invoke either differences or
changes in inventory control to explain empirical observations regarding the
volatility of production or trade. Altomonte et al. (2013) show, using French
microdata, that during the financial crisis not only was international trade
more volatile than GDP, but that trade between affiliates of multinational
enterprises was much more volatile than arm’s-length trade. They attribute
this to a bullwhip effect occurring within vertically integrated supply chains
(i.e., within multinationals) but not in decentralized ones. The macroeco-
nomic literature on the "Great Moderation" attributes an observed decline
in aggregate economic volatility after 1985 (and before the recent financial
crisis) at least partly to changes in inventory control (see Wen, 2005b, and
Davis and Kahn, 2008), although the nature of these changes is not spelled
out very precisely.
By constructing a model of inventory investment in supply chains that
combines essential features from the microeconomic theories of the bullwhip
effect and from theories of vertical control of inventory we seek to provide
a framework that may ultimately help to better understand these empirical
findings. Two elements of our model are common to both sets of theories:
First, inventory has to be ordered from the manufacturer and production
has to take place before goods can be sold by the retailer; we assume, for
simplicity, that inventory ordered this period only arrives next period. The
retailer’s sales are hence from inventory. Second, goods have to be ordered
and produced before demand is known. If the retailer orders too little and
stocks out, sales are lost. Hence there is a stockout-avoidance motive for
holding inventory.
A third element of our model comes from the literature on the bullwhip
effect: Demand may be positively correlated across periods so that observed
demand this period may provide a signal about demand next period and
hence about how much inventory should be ordered for next period. The
seminal paper by Kahn (1987) explains why this may give rise to the bull-
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whip effect. An intuitive explanation is as follows: If demand today turns
out to be high, the retailer responds by raising sales and by placing orders
over and above what would be needed to replenish its inventory, because
it takes the positive demand shock as a signal that demand will also be
high tomorrow. However, if demand today turns out to be low, the retailer
reduces sales and runs down its inventory in anticipation of low demand
tomorrow. Due to this demand persistence effect, inventory investment is
positively correlated with the retailer’s sales and, as a result, the variance
of retail orders (and hence manufacturer production) exceeds the variance
of retail sales.
The paper by Kahn explores the inventory investment of a monopolist.
We extend Kahn’s model to a supply chain composed of a manufacturer and
a retailer, which allows us to consider how, in a decentralized supply chain,
the manufacturer adjusts the producer price in response to a demand shock.
We show that the manufacturer will raise the producer price in response
to a positive demand shock and lower the producer price in response to
a negative demand shock. This price effect tends to dampen the variance
of production. In fact, we show that with sufficiently small persistence of
demand shocks, the price effect dampens the variance of production so much
that it becomes smaller than the variance of retail sales so that the bullwhip
effect is reversed. Following the macroeconomic literature we refer to this
case as production smoothing. Only when the demand persistence effect is
big enough to dominate the price effect do we observe the bullwhip effect in
a decentralized supply chain. By contrast, in a vertically integrated supply
chain, in which such price adjustments do not occur, we observe the bullwhip
effect for any positive persistence of demand shocks, which mirrors Kahn’s
results for a monopolist.5
In modelling the vertical control of inventory we follow in particular Qu
et al. (2017). That paper examines how the volume and intertemporal allo-
cation of inventory differ between supply chains with centralized inventory
control and decentralized supply chains, in which inventory is controlled by
competitive retailers, respectively an exclusive retailer. Their focus is on
how the incentive problems associated with inventory control can best be
solved so that the supply chain’s aggregate profit can be maximized. By
contrast, we explore the effect of different forms of inventory control on the
variances of sales and production, and thus on the transmission of demand
5Kahn’s model has been extended to a supply chain and adapted for the operations
management literature by Lee et al. (1997a). However, in Lee et al. (1997a), as in the
more recent models of the bullwhip effect in the operations management literature (e.g.,
Warburton, 2004; Gilbert, 2005) prices are typically taken as fixed. These papers hence
do not feature a price effect.
See also Reagan (1982) who provides a rigorous mathematical characterization of the
optimal pricing and inventory decisions of a monopolist but does not compute or compare
the variances of sales and production.
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shocks in supply chains. The theoretical challenge we have to overcome in
the current paper is to find a way to compare variances of production and
sales not just with each other but across different forms of inventory con-
trol. The simple solution we provide can be viewed, from a microeconomic
modelling perspective, as a key innovation of the paper.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce
the model, provide formal definitions of the bullwhip effect and production
smoothing, and prove a lemma that shows how we can compare the vari-
ances of manufacturer production and retail sales. Section 3 contains results
for a general-demand-function specification. The implicit assumptions we
make in this section to simplify the analysis are explored in Section 4. There
we provide closed-form solutions for a linear demand function and provide
explicit sufficient conditions for the assumptions made in Section 3. In Sec-
tion 5 we explore the robustness of our results to changes in retail market
structure and the pricing schemes the manufacturer may use in a decentral-
ized supply chain. We focus on one extension, in particular, namely allowing
the manufacturer to use a two-part tariff instead of a simple linear tariff.
This extension turns out to be non-trivial, because there is no longer a price
effect. We are able to show that all or our results continue to hold, albeit for
a different reason. Section 6 concludes, and the appendix contains proofs.
2 The Model
Consider a supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer. The
retailer sells to consumers in two periods, t = 1, 2, with consumer demand in
each period characterized by an inverse demand function p (st) + εt, where
st denotes sales, εt is a demand shock, and p
′ < 0, sp′+ p > 0, p′+ sp′′ < 0.
The demand shock may be serially correlated: ε1 = v1 and ε2 = ρε1 + v2,
where E (vt) = 0, vt is i.i.d. with cumulative distribution function F (·) and
support on [vl, vh], and ρ ∈ [0, 1] measures the persistence of the demand
shock. The revenue function is denoted by R (st, εt) = [p (st) + εt] st, the
marginal revenue is
∂
∂st
R (st, εt) = p (st) + stp
′ (st) + εt ≡ m (st) + εt.
We use the following assumption below:
m′ + sm′′ < 0, (A1)
which is satisfied, for instance, for linear demand and whenever the marginal
revenue function is not too convex.
All sales are from inventory, which means that the retailer has to place
orders with the manufacturer, and goods have to be produced, before the
realization of demand has been observed. We assume, in particular, that
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goods have to be ordered and produced one period before they can be sold.
Hence sales in period 1 come from inventory ordered and produced in period
0. Sales in period 2 come either from goods ordered and produced in period
1, or from inventory left over from period 1.
We keep the cost structure as simple as possible. The manufacturer
incurs a constant marginal cost, denoted by c, and the marginal cost of re-
tailing is normalized to zero. We further assume that there is no discounting
between periods and no cost for storing inventory between periods.
We can now summarize the order of moves as follows: In period 0, the
manufacturer sets a producer price P0, and the retailer orders an amount
q0. In period 1, the order arrives and, after observing the demand shock ε1,
the retailer decides how much to sell in period 1, s1 ≤ q0. After observing
ε1 and s1, the manufacturer sets producer price P1, and the retailer then
decides how much to order for period 2, q1. In period 2, the order from
period 1 arrives and the demand shock ε2 is observed. The retailer then
sells s2 ≤ q1 + (q0 − s1).
At the heart of our analysis is a comparison of the variance of sales,
V ar [s1(ε1)], with the variance of production, V ar [q1(ε1)]. If V ar [q1(ε1)] >
V ar [s1(ε1)], we say that the supply chain experiences a bullwhip effect.
Production smoothing is said to occur, if V ar [q1(ε1)] < V ar [s1(ε1)]. The
following Lemma helps us compare these variances by showing how we can
link them to the sensitivity of sales and production with respect to demand
shocks. It thus represents the key mathematical insight that we apply to
prove our results.
Lemma 1 Let t1 (ε1) and t2 (ε1) be functions of ε1. If t
′
1 (ε1) > t
′
2 (ε1) > 0
for any ε1, then V ar [t1 (ε1)] > V ar [t2 (ε1)].
Proof: See Appendix.
3 The Bullwhip Effect and Production Smoothing
in Supply Chains
3.1 Vertically Integrated Supply Chain
Suppose manufacturing and retailing are vertically integrated, so that the
manufacturer controls inventory. The sequence of decisions is then as fol-
lows. In period 0, the manufacturer produces q0. In period 1, after observing
ε1, the manufacturer sells s1 ≤ q0, and produces q1. In period 2, the manu-
facturer sells s2 ≤ q1 + (q0 − s1).
To simplify the analysis we make three assumptions that we explore
further in the next section. There we explain that the assumptions are
satisfied, if the demand shocks are below a certain threshold. First, we
assume that the manufacturer sells all inventory on hand in period 2, i.e.,
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s2 = q1 + (q0 − s1). Second, we assume that the manufacturer produces
a sufficient quantity in period 0 to make sure that there is no stockout in
period 1. Third, like in the paper by Kahn (1987), we assume that q1 > 0.
Regarding the manufacturer’s choice of q1, it turns out to be convenient
to derive this indirectly by solving the maximization problem with respect
to sales in period 2, s2:
max
s2
R (s2, ρε1)− c [s2 − (q0 − s1)] .
The first-order condition,
m (s2) + ρε1 = c, (1)
determines sales in period 2, s2(c, ρε1), from which we can compute
q1 = s2 (c, ρε1) + s1 − q0. (2)
Consider next how the manufacturer would choose s1 after ε1 has been
observed. It is easy to see that the manufacturer’s optimal choice is de-
termined by setting revenue from selling an additional unit of inventory in
period 1 equal to the cost of replacing it:
m (s1) + ε1 = c. (3)
Writing the manufacturer’s optimal sales in period 1 as s1 (c, ε1), we observe
from (3) that ∂s1(c,ε1)∂ε1 > 0.
We know from Lemma 1 that there is a bullwhip effect if ∂q1(ε1)
∂ε1
>
∂s1(c,ε1)
∂ε1
> 0. Noting that q0 is independent of ε1, since it is chosen before
ε1 is observed, we obtain from (2) and (1)
∂q1 (ε1)
∂ε1
−
∂s1 (c, ε1)
∂ε1
=
∂s2 (c, ε1)
∂ε1
= −
ρ
m′ (s2)
. (4)
For later reference we call the impact of ε1 on s2 displayed in (4) the demand
persistence effect. It implies that production is more sensitive to demand
shocks than sales for any ρ > 0, which leads directly to the following result:
Proposition 1 A vertically integrated supply chain experiences a bullwhip
effect if ρ > 0.
This result is our version of Kahn’s (1987) finding that a monopolist
experiences a bullwhip effect, if there is positive demand persistence. The
behavior of a vertically integrated supply chain is simply the same as that of
a monopolist. However, as we show in the next subsection, positive demand
persistence is not sufficient to generate a bullwhip effect in a decentralized
supply chain.
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3.2 Decentralized Supply Chain
To characterize the equilibrium in a decentralized supply chain we stick to
the implicit simplifying assumptions from the previous case, namely that the
manufacturer sells all inventory on hand in period 2, i.e., sr2 = qr1 + (qr0 −
sr1), where the subscript r denotes the decentralized case, where inventory
is controlled by the retailer; that there is no stockout in period 1; and that
qr1 > 0. We provide sufficient conditions for these assumptions to hold in
the next section.
To determine whether there exists a bullwhip effect, we again have to
examine the derivative of sr2 with respect to ε1. The retailer’s choice of sr2
now solves
max
sr2
R (sr2, ρε1)− Pr1 [sr2 − (qr0 − sr1)] .
The first-order condition w.r.t. sr2 is
m (sr2) + ρε1 = Pr1, (5)
which implicitly determines sr2 (Pr1, ρε1). The demand persistence effect is
obviously still at work here: for given Pr1 an increase in ε1 raises sr2 for any
ρ > 0, which implies that production is more sensitive to demand shocks
than sales so that the supply chain experiences a bullwhip effect.
However, we want to show that there now exists an offsetting effect, the
price effect: An increase in ε1 raises Pr1, which in turn reduces sr2, since
∂sr2
∂Pr1
=
1
m′ (sr2)
< 0. (6)
In other words, the price effect makes production less sensitive to demand
shocks than sales, which implies production smoothing.
To see that Pr1 is increasing in ε1, consider the manufacturer’s choice of
Pr1 to maximize its period-1 expected profit
E1 (πr1) = (Pr1 − c) (sr2 + sr1 − qr0) .
The first-order condition w.r.t. Pr1 is given by
sr2 + sr1 − qr0 + (Pr1 − c)
1
m′ (sr2)
= 0, (7)
which implicitly determines Pr1 (qr0 − sr1, sr2, c). After observing ε1, the
retailer chooses sr1 to equalize marginal revenue to next period’s expected
marginal revenue, which we know from (5) is equal to Pr1:
m (sr1) + ε1 = Pr1. (8)
The positive effect of ε1 on Pr1 can be now confirmed by totally differen-
tiating equations (5), (7), and (8), and then using Cramer’s Rule to obtain
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∂Pr1/∂ε1 (see the Proof of Proposition 2 in the appendix). The intuition for
this positive effect is simple: For given Pr1 and qr0, an increase in ε1 raises
sr1, which reduces the excess inventory the retailer can take into period 2
and hence induces the retailer to increase the order qr1. The manufacturer
responds to this greater demand by raising Pr1.
We can now see why the price effect makes production less sensitive to
demand shocks than sales. As (6) tells us, the increase in Pr1 resulting
from a positive demand shock dampens the rise in qr1 more than the rise in
sr1. Similarly, the decrease in Pr1 associated with a negative demand shock
means that qr1 falls by less than sr1.
Whether a decentralized supply chain exhibits a bullwhip effect or pro-
duction smoothing is determined by the relative strength of the demand
persistence effect and the price effect. If ρ = 0 so that there is zero demand
persistence, then the price effect implies that the supply chain exhibits pro-
duction smoothing. At the opposite extreme, with ρ = 1 and thus perfect
demand persistence, the demand persistence effect dominates the price ef-
fect, so that the supply chain exhibits a bullwhip effect. To see why this is
the case, notice that with ρ = 1 sales in period 1, sr1, are equal to expected
sales in period 2, sr2, which implies that qr1 = 2sr1 − qr0. It follows that
orders in period 1 are twice as sensitive to demand shocks as sales: In case
of a positive demand shock, the retailer not only has to increase the order to
replenish inventory after greater than expected sales in period 1, it also has
to order more so that it can satisfy the expected greater demand in period
2. We may hence state:
Proposition 2 A decentralized supply chain exhibits a bullwhip effect if ρ =
1, and production smoothing if ρ = 0.
Proof: See Appendix.
We have shown that under two extreme conditions, namely ρ = 0 and
ρ = 1, production smoothing, respectively a bullwhip effect, will occur. It
is natural to try to establish that there exists a cutoff value ρ∗, such that
production smoothing is obtained if ρ < ρ∗ and a bullwhip effect is obtained
if ρ > ρ∗. However, within our general demand function framework, this
would require an additional assumption regarding the sign of m′′′ (s) to
ensure that the difference between the variances of production and sales is
monotonically increasing in ρ. But such a sign restriction has no meaningful
economic interpretation. With a linear inverse demand function, to which we
turn in the next section, we can easily ensure monotonicity of the variances
and hence prove the existence of ρ∗.
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4 Closed-Form Solutions
In this section we work with a linear inverse demand function p (st) = 1−
st + εt. We do this for two reasons. First, we want to derive a sufficient
condition to ensure that the implicit assumptions we made in the previous
section, namely that all inventory is sold in period 2, there are no stockouts
in period 1, and the quantity ordered in period 1 is strictly positive, are
satisfied. We show that such a condition is given by
d < d = min

1− c
3 (2− ρ)
,
c√
2 + ρ
√
2− 1


. (A2)
Second, we want to obtain a closed-form solution for ρ∗, such that production
smoothing is obtained for ρ < ρ∗ and a bullwhip effect for ρ > ρ∗.
4.1 Vertically Integrated Supply Chain
Using (1), (2) and (3), we can establish that desired sales in periods 1 and 2
are s1 =
1−c+ε1
2 and s2 =
1+ρε1−c
2 , respectively, from which we can confirm
that ∂s2∂ε1 > 0 for ρ > 0. This guarantees a bullwhip effect for any ρ > 0,
as stated in Proposition 1. The manufacturer can achieve optimal sales and
avoid a stockout in period 1 for any realization of ε1 by producing in period
0 a quantity equal to q0 =
1−c+d
2 . By adjusting production in period 1 to
the realization of ε1 and producing a quantity equal to
q1 =
1 + (1 + ρ)ε1 − c− d
2
the manufacturer ensure optimal expected sales in period 2.
It is now easy to show that q1 > 0 for d < d. We can also confirm that
the manufacturer sells all inventory in period 2 so that s2 = q1 − (q0 − s1),
because d < d is sufficient for marginal revenue in period 2 to be positive
for all realizations of v1 and v2.
4.2 Decentralized Supply Chain
As shown in the Appendix in the proof of Proposition 3, the closed-form
solutions for production and sales in a decentralized supply chain are:
qr1 (ε1, ρ) =
2 (1− c)
9
+
(1 + ρ)
6
ε1, (9)
sr1 (ε1, ρ) =
5 (1− c)
18
+
(2− ρ)
6
ε1. (10)
From these solutions we can immediately verify Proposition 2 by comparing
∂qr1
∂ε1
= 1+ρ6 and
∂sr1
∂ε1
= 2−ρ6 for ρ = 0, 1. However, we can go a step further
by noting that ∂qr1∂ε1 is increasing and
∂sr1
∂ε1
is decreasing in ρ, which implies:
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Proposition 3 Suppose that demand is linear, and that d < d. Then in a
decentralized supply chain the variance of production is increasing in ρ; and
the variance of sales is decreasing in ρ.
Proof: See Appendix.
This result means that there must exist a critical value ρ∗, such that
for ρ < ρ∗ the price effect dominates the demand persistence effect and the
supply chain exhibits production smoothing, whereas for ρ > ρ∗ the demand
persistence effect dominates the price effect and the supply chain exhibits a
bullwhip effect. In fact, we can compute ρ∗ explicitly by setting ∂qr1∂ε1 =
∂sr1
∂ε1
.
We may hence state:
Corollary 1 In a decentralized supply chain there exists a cutoff value ρ∗ =
1/2, such that production smoothing occurs if ρ < ρ∗, and a bullwhip effect
occurs if ρ > ρ∗.
Another immediate consequence of Proposition 3 in the case where ρ >
ρ∗ is given by:
Corollary 2 In a decentralized supply chain the bullwhip effect is increasing
in ρ.
Finally it is interesting to compare the variances of production and sales
across organizational forms. Comparing ∂qr1∂ε1 and
∂sr1
∂ε1
with the respective
values for a vertically integrated supply chain, we see that they are both
smaller for any value of ρ, which is obviously due to the presence of a price
effect in the decentralized supply chain. We may hence conclude:
Proposition 4 Suppose that demand is linear, and that d < d. Then the
variances of both production and sales are greater in a vertically integrated
than in a decentralized supply chain.
5 Extension: Decentralized Supply Chain with Two-
part Tariffs
In our analysis of a decentralized supply chain we assumed that the manu-
facturer uses linear pricing to sell goods to the retailer. While this is a real-
istic description of pricing schemes in many chains and thus often taken for
granted in the operations management literature (see Krishnan and Winter,
2011), there will certainly be supply chains that adopt more sophisticated
pricing schemes. One of the reasons is that linear pricing implies double
marginalization and thus a vertical price distortion that, in principle, could
be dealt with by using a two-part tariff consisting of a per-unit price and a
fixed fee or transfer to the manufacturer. We show in this section that our
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earlier results continue to hold, even if the manufacturer adopts two-part
tariffs. What makes this an especially interesting case to analyze is that
there is no longer a price effect to dampen the variance of production and
thus to lead to production smoothing for sufficiently low values of ρ. In fact,
as we will demonstrate below, the manufacturer will set the per-unit price
in period 1 equal to marginal cost and thus no longer adjust the producer
price to the demand shock. Production smoothing will instead be driven by
a different intertemporal pattern of production.6
We continue with same model as in the previous section, making the
additional assumption that vt is uniformly distributed on [−d, d]. The only
difference as far as decisions are concerned is that in each period t = 0, 1
the manufacturer now sets a two-part tariff, consisting of a producer price
Pwt and a fixed fee or transfer Twt, where the subscript w denotes the two-
part-tariff case.
Consider the retailer’s choice of qw1 for given Pw1. Assuming that all
inventory is sold in period 2 so that sw2 = qw1 + qw0 − sw1, the retailer’s
maximization problem can be written as
max
qw1
(1− qw1 − qw0 + sw1 + ρε1)(qw1 + qw0 − sw1)− Pw1qw1 − Tw1.
The first-order condition yields
qw1 =
1− Pw1 + ρε1
2
− (qw0 − sw1), (11)
and hence an expected retail price in period 2 equal to p2 =
1+Pw1+ρε1
2 . The
retailer’s expected profit in period 1 can hence be calculated as
E(πw2) =

1 + Pw1 + ρε1
2

1− Pw1 + ρε1
2
−Pw1

1− Pw1 + ρε1
2
− (qw0 − sw1)

− Tw1
=
(1− Pw1 + ρε1)2
4
+ Pw1(qw0 − sw1)− Tw1.
Notice that in period 1 the retailer can guarantee itself an expected profit
of at least
πout ≡ [1− (qw0 − sw1) + ρε1] (qw0 − sw1), (12)
by not ordering any inventory in period 1, and simply selling in period
2 its excess inventory, qw0 − sw1, at the resulting expected retail price
6The derivation of equilibrium production and sales in this section follows Qu et al.
(2017). As that paper makes clear, we could also extend our current model to a multi-
retailer setting. In such a setting the price effect would still occur, as long as the manu-
facturer uses a linear pricing scheme. Our key results would thus be unchanged. However,
in the presence of a two-part-tariff there is no need for the manufacturer to use more than
one retailer.
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[1− (qw0 − sw1) + ρε1]. In fact, even if the retailer orders a positive quantity
in period 1, the manufacturer can only set Tw1 so as to extract the retailer’s
profit net of πout.
The manufacturer thus chooses (Pw1, Tw1), such that Tw1 = E(πw2) −
πout and Pw1 maximizes
max
Pw1
(Pw1 − c) qw1 +
(1− Pw1 + ρε1)2
4
+ Pw1(qw0 − sw1)− πout.
Using (11) in the corresponding first-order condition yields Pw1 = c. Thus,
the two-part tariff eliminates the price effect.
Now consider the retailer’s optimal choice of sw1: At the margin a unit
sold in period 1 has to yield the same revenue as holding on to that unit
and selling it in period 2. That, is the marginal revenue in period 1,MR1 =
1− 2sw1 + ε1, has to equal expected marginal revenue in period 2, which is
determined by the outside option and given by −dπ
out
dsw1
= 1− 2(qw0− sw1) +
ρε1. We hence obtain
sw1 =
qw0
2
+
(1− ρ) ε1
4
. (13)
Notice that the retailer thus sells in period 1 only half the inventory acquired
in period 0, adjusted for a term that depends on ε1, and holds on to the rest
to boost πout.
In period 0, as is straightforward to see (and shown formally in the
appendix), the manufacturer will use Tw0 to extract the retailer’s total ex-
pected profit, including the outside profit πout that the retailer can retain
in period 1. To capture the retailer’s maximum profit, the manufacturer
optimally sets Pw0 = c+

3
2 −
√
2

d (1 + ρ), which implies that the quantity
produced in period 0 equals qw0 = 1− c−

3
2 −
√
2

d (1 + ρ).7
What this implies for sales in period 1 can be determined by using qw0 =
1− c−

3
2 −
√
2

d (1 + ρ) in (13) to obtain
sw1 (ε1, ρ) =
1− c−

3
2 −
√
2

d (1 + ρ)
2
+
(1− ρ) ε1
4
. (14)
If ρ = 1, so that the expected demand shock in period 2, E (ε2), is exactly
equal to the observed demand shock in period 1, ε1, the retailer will set
sw1 (ε1, ρ) =
qw0
2 independently of ε1. Thus the variance of sales is zero at
ρ = 1, and given that ∂
2sw1
∂ρ∂ε1
< 0, we see that it increases as ρ is reduced
below 1 (an analogous proof has been shown in the appendix in the Proof
of Proposition 3).
7We show below that this quantity is large enough to cover retail sales in both periods
1 and 2 if ε1 is small. This can be seen most easily, if we we let d = 0. In this case,
the manufacturer would set Pw0 = c, and the retailer would order qw0 = 1 − c, which is
exactly equal to optimal monopoly sales over two periods.
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Turning to qw1, we show in the appendix that the retailer does not order
any inventory in period 1, if ε1 < ε
z
w1 = −

3− 2
√
2

d. This is intuitive:
Given that the retailer has ordered enough inventory in period 0 to cover
expected sales in both period 1 and period 2, there is no need to order more,
when demand in period 1 turns out to be low. Only if ε1 > ε
z
w1, does the
retailer order a positive amount in period 1, which we show in the appendix
is equal to (1 + ρ)
(3−2
√
2)d+ε1
4 ; this amount is required to make sure that it
has enough inventory in period 2 to realize optimal expected sales. Thus we
obtain
qw1 (ε1, ρ) =

0
(1 + ρ)
(3−2
√
2)d+ε1
4
if ε1 ∈ [−d, εzw1]
if ε1 ∈ [εzw1, d]
. (15)
By inspecting (15), we can see how the intertemporal pattern of retail
orders and thus manufacturer output dampens the variance of production.
In particular, the fact that a large quantity of output is produced in period
0 implies that for any demand shock in the interval [−d, εzw1], qw1 (ε1, ρ) is
equal to 0; only if ε1 ∈ [εzw1, d] does production vary with the demand shock.
Hence there is a positive probability, equal to F (εzw1), that production is
constantly equal to zero. From (14) and (15), we see that for ρ = 0, the
variance of production has to be smaller than the variance of retail sales,
since ∂qw1∂ε1 ≤
∂sw1
∂ε1
, and in the interval [−d, εzw1] this inequality is strict. For
ρ = 1, the opposite has to be true, as the variance of production is positive
and the variance of retail sales is zero.
Moreover, notice that the variance of production is increasing in ρ, due
to ∂
2qw1
∂ρ∂ε1
≥ 0, and this inequality is strict in the interval [εzw1, d]. Since the
variance of retail sales is decreasing in ρ, we know that there exists a critical
value ρ̂, such that production smoothing occurs if ρ < ρ̂ and a bullwhip
effect occurs if ρ > ρ̂. As before, we can also show that the bullwhip effect is
increasing in ρ, and the variances of production and retail sales are smaller
in a decentralized supply chain with two-part-tariffs than in a vertically
integrated supply chain.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we constructed a simple model of a supply chain consisting of
an upstream firm (the manufacturer) and a downstream firm (the retailer)
to study how final-demand volatility is transmitted upstream in the chain.
In particular, we wanted to know under which circumstances this volatility
is enhanced so that the variance of upstream production is greater than the
variance of downstream sales (the bullwhip effect), or dampened so that the
variance of production becomes smaller than the variance of downstream
sales (production smoothing).
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We showed that the transmission of demand shocks, and thus the occur-
rence of a bullwhip effect or production smoothing, depends on the interplay
of two factors, namely the way in which inventory control is organized and
the degree of persistence of demand shocks. If the supply chain is vertically
integrated so that inventory control is centralized, then a bullwhip effect
occurs for any positive degree of demand persistence. In a decentralized
supply chain, the bullwhip effect appears only if the persistence exceeds a
critical value. Otherwise the decentralized supply chain exhibits production
smoothing.
The economic mechanism behind the bullwhip effect in a centralized sup-
ply chain is the same as that explored by Kahn (1987): as long as demand
shocks are persistent, a positive demand shock today raises production by
more than sales, because not only has inventory to be replenished to ac-
count for today’s greater sales, but inventory also has to rise in anticipation
of greater demand tomorrow. In case of a negative demand shock, this mech-
anism works the other way round so that production decreases by more than
sales. As a result of this demand persistence effect, the variance of produc-
tion exceeds the variance of sales. Moreover, we show that, if there is a
bullwhip effect, then it becomes stronger the greater is the persistence of
demand shocks.
In a decentralized supply chain, the demand persistence effect is not
sufficient to induce a bullwhip effect, because it is counteracted by a price
effect, namely the manufacturer’s producer price adjustment. In fact, if the
persistence of demand is sufficiently weak, the price effect dominates the de-
mand persistence effect and the supply chain exhibits production smoothing.
Why this happens can be seen most easily, if the demand persistence is zero.
Thus, when there is a positive demand shock, the retailer sells more today
which raises its demand for inventory for next period. The manufacturer
reacts by increasing the producer price. The opposite happens in case of a
negative demand shock: because the retailer has more excess inventory, its
demand for additional inventory for next period falls, and the manufacturer
responds by reducing the producer price. This price effect dampens the
variance of production relative to the variance of sales so that production
smoothing occurs.
Interestingly, the results of the paper continue to hold, if the manufac-
turer is allowed to use a two-part tariff instead of a simple linear producer
price. This is the case despite the fact that there is no price effect, as the
manufacturer finds it optimal to keep the producer price in period one equal
to marginal cost and thus not adjust it in response to demand shocks. Pro-
duction smoothing in a decentralized supply chain now comes about due to a
different equilibrium order pattern. In particular, the retailer orders such a
large quantity in period zero that it only has to reorder goods in period one
if demand happens to be sufficiently big. In other words, there is a positive
probability that production in period one is zero and thus unresponsive to
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the demand shock, which naturally dampens the variance of production.
By providing a simple microeconomic model of the transmission of de-
mand shocks in a supply chain our paper may help shed light on a wide
range of empirical studies. Most directly related are studies of how demand
volatility is passed upstream through different echelons of a supply chain
from retailers to wholesalers to various layers of production. This research
goes back at least to Holt et al. (1968) and has been taken up most promi-
nently by the operations management literature already cited above. We
show, among other things, that the extent of the pass-through of volatility
depends on where and how in the chain inventory is managed.
Our model can rationalize not only the observation that international
trade was more volatile than GDP during and after the financial crisis, but
also the micro-level evidence by Altomonte et al. (2013) that intra-firm
trade was more volatile than arm’s-length trade, which directly corresponds
to our result that shipments by the manufacturer should be more volatile in
a vertically integrated than in a decentralized supply chain. The explanation
we provide is that in a decentralized supply chain the volatility of shipments
will be dampened by the manufacturer’s price adjustment.
Another line of research, as mentioned in the introduction, concerns the
macroeconomic literature on the "Great Moderation" that has identified a
decline in aggregate economic volatility after 1985 (and before the recent
financial crisis). As already mentioned above, this observation is partly at-
tributed to changes in inventory control (see Wen, 2005b, and Davis and
Kahn, 2008), but also to a decline in the persistence of demand shocks
(Ramey and Vine, 2006). Our model could rationalize the decline in output
volatility through two possible micro-level channels. First, a moderation
of production volatility would come about for a given level of persistence,
if inventory control in a supply chain becomes decentralized. This might,
for instance, happen if the retailer, or more generally a downstream firm,
outsourced production to an independent supplier, but kept control of inven-
tory. Second, in a decentralized supply chain, a change from the bullwhip
effect to production smoothing would occur, if the persistence of demand
shocks declined, which is what Ramey and Vine argue has happened in the
US automobile industry.
7 Appendix
7.1 Proof of Lemma 1
To prove Lemma 1 we make use of the following result from Gurland (1967):
Lemma 2 Let X be a random variable, and let n, m be continuous functions
on R. If n is monotonically increasing andm monotonically decreasing, then
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E [n (X)m (X)] ≤ E [n (X)]E [m (X)]. If n, m are both monotonically in-
creasing or decreasing, then E [n (X)m (X)] ≥ E [n (X)]E [m (X)]. More-
over, in both cases, if both functions are strictly monotone, the inequality is
strict.
Consider the function g (λ, ε1) = λt1 (ε1)+ (1− λ) t2 (ε1). Easily we can
check thatE
	
∂[g(λ,ε1)]
2
∂λ


=
∂E[g(λ,ε1)2]
∂λ
, and ∂
∂λ
E [g (λ, ε1)] = E

∂
∂λ
g (λ, ε1)

.
Consider how the variance of g (λ, ε1) changes with λ:
∂
∂λV ar [g (λ, ε1)] =
E

2g (λ, ε1)
∂
∂λ
g (λ, ε1)

−E [2g (λ, ε1)]E

∂
∂λ
g (λ, ε1)

.
Furthermore, ∂∂ε1 g (λ, ε1) = λ
∂t1(ε1)
∂ε1
+(1− λ) ∂t2(ε1)∂ε1 > 0 and
∂
∂ε1

∂
∂λg (λ, ε1)

=
∂t1(ε1)
∂ε1
− ∂t2(ε1)
∂ε1
> 0. Using Lemma 2, we can state that ∂
∂λ
V ar [g (λ, ε1)] >
0, which implies V ar [g (1, ε1)] > V ar [g (0, ε1)], that is, V ar [t1 (ε1)] >
V ar [t2 (ε1)].
7.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Consider first the second-order condition for the manufacturer’s choice of
Pr1. This condition is satisfied if:
2
∂sr2
∂Pr1
+ (Pr1 − c)
∂2sr2
∂ (Pr1)
2
=

m′ (sr2)
−1 
2− (Pr1 − c)m′′ (sr2)

m′ (sr2)
−2
< 0
which requires that 2− (Pr1 − c)m′′ (sr2) [m′ (sr2)]−2 > 0. In fact, equation
(7) means that
Pr1 − c = −m′ (sr2) (sr2 + sr1 − qr0) < −m′ (sr2) sr2
and therefore
1− (Pr1 − c)m′′ (sr2)

m′ (sr2)
−2
> 1 + sr2m
′′ (sr2)

m′ (sr2)
−1
> 0,
in which the last inequality follows from assumption (A1).
Totally differentiating the equations (5), (7) and (8), we obtain



0 m′ (sr2) −1
1 1− (Pr1−c)m
′′(sr2)
[m′(sr2)]
2
1
m′(sr2)
m′ (sr1) 0 −1





∂sr1
∂sr2
∂Pr1

 =


−ρ
0
−1

∂ε1
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Using Cramer’s Rule, we have
∂sr1
∂ε1
=
(ρ− 1)

1− (Pr1 − c) [m′ (sr2)]−2m′′ (sr2)

− 1
m′ (sr2) +

2− (Pr1 − c) [m′ (sr2)]−2m′′ (sr2)

m′ (sr1)
∂sr2
∂ε1
=
(1− ρ)− ρm′ (sr1) [m′ (sr2)]−1
m′ (sr2) +

2− (Pr1 − c) [m′ (sr2)]−2m′′ (sr2)

m′ (sr1)
∂Pr1
∂ε1
=
ρ

1− (Pr1 − c) [m′ (sr2)]−2m′′ (sr2)

m′ (sr1) +m
′ (sr2)
m′ (sr2) +

2− (Pr1 − c) [m′ (sr2)]−2m′′ (sr2)

m′ (sr1)
We can show that ∂sr1∂ε1 > 0 and
∂qr1
∂ε1
= ∂sr1∂ε1 +
∂sr2
∂ε1
> 0. For ρ = 0, we find
that ∂sr2∂ε1 < 0, and for ρ = 1 we obtain
∂sr2
∂ε1
> 0. Using Lemma 1 completes
the proof.
7.3 Proof of Proposition 3
Using (5), (7) and (8), we can derive explicit expressions for sr1, sr2, Pr1
and also qr1 as functions of qr0 and ε1. They are given by:
sr1 =
1
6
[1 + (2− ρ) ε1 − c] +
1
3
qr0
sr2 =
1
6
[1 + (2ρ− 1) ε1 − c] +
1
3
qr0
Pr1 =
2 + (1 + ρ) ε1 + c
3
−
2
3
qr0
qr1 =
1
6
[2 + (1 + ρ) ε1 − 2c]−
1
3
qr0
A stockout occurs if sr1 ≥ qr0, which would happen if ε1 were to exceed the
cutoff value εsr1 =
4qr0−1+c
2−ρ . We will show below that ε
s
r1 is always larger
than d, given Assumption (A2). But first we derive a closed-form solution
for qr0.
In period 0, the retailer maximizes:
max
qr0
d
−d
[(1− sr1 + ε1) sr1 + (1− sr2 + ρε1) sr2 − Pr1qr1] dF (ε1)− Pr0qr0.
The first-order condition (FOC) with respect to qr0 is given by
d
−d

8 + (4 + 4ρ) ε1 + c
9
−
8
9
qr0

dF (ε1)− Pr0 = 0.
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In the period 0, the manufacturer’s revenue is hence equal to
Pr0qr0 =
d
−d

8 + (4 + 4ρ) ε1 + c
9
−
8
9
qr0

qr0dF (ε1) ,
and the manufacturer’s total expected profit across the two periods is given
by
E [(Pr0 − c) qr0 + (Pr1 − c) qr1]
=
d
−d

8 + (4 + 4ρ) ε1 − 8c
9
−
8
9
qr0

qr0dF (ε1)
+
d
−d

2 + (1 + ρ) ε1 − 2c
3
−
2
3
qr0

2 + (1 + ρ) ε1 − 2c
6
−
1
3
qr0

dF (ε1) .
Deriving the FOC with respect to qr0 and simplifying yields qr0 =
1−c
3 .
Using this solution we can rewrite qr1 (ε1) and sr1 (ε1) to obtain (10) and
(9).
Now notice from (10) and (9) that ∂qr1
∂ε1
= 1+ρ6 is increasing in ρ (i.e.
∂2qr1
∂ρ∂ε1
> 0), and that ∂sr1∂ε1 =
2−ρ
6 is decreasing in ρ (i.e.
∂2sr1
∂ρ∂ε1
< 0). Therefore
for any ρ1 and ρ2, such that 0 < ρ1 < ρ2 < 1, we have 0 <
∂qr1
∂ε1

ρ=ρ1
<
∂qr1
∂ε1

ρ=ρ2
and ∂sr1∂ε1

ρ=ρ1
> ∂sr1∂ε1

ρ=ρ2
> 0, which means that ∂qr1(ε1,ρ2)∂ε1 >
∂qr1(ε1,ρ1)
∂ε1
> 0 and ∂sr1(ε1,ρ1)∂ε1 >
∂sr1(ε1,ρ2)
∂ε1
> 0 for any ε1. Lemma 1 hence
tells us that V ar [qr1 (ε1, ρ2)] > V ar [qr1 (ε1, ρ1)] and V ar [sr1 (ε1, ρ2)] <
V ar [sr1 (ε1, ρ1)]
Using these solutions we can verify that for d < d there is no stock-
out, because εsr1 =
4qr0−1+c
2−ρ =
1−c
3(2−ρ) > d, and that sr1, sr2, qr1, Pr1 > 0.
Moreover MR2 = Pr1 + v2 > 0 for all realizations of v1 and v2 if d < d.
7.4 Derivation of qw1 (ε1, ρ) and sw1 (ε1, ρ)
Using (13) in (11) we find
qw1 =
2 (1− c)− 2qw0 + (1 + ρ) ε1
4
.
Notice that qw1 = 0, if
2 (1− c)− 2qw0 + (1 + ρ) ε1
4
≤ 0,
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and thus qw1 > 0 if ε1 exceeds a cutoff value given by
εzw1 = −
2− 2c− 2qw0
(1 + ρ)
.
If qw1 = 0, the retailer will use its initial inventory of qw0 to cover sales in
both periods, szw1+s
z
w2 = qw0, and will allocate qw0 between periods so as to
equalize marginal revenue in in period 1 with the expected marginal revenue
in period 2:
1− 2szw1 + ε1 = 1− 2s
z
w2 + ρε1.
Solving for szw1, we obtain the same solution as in (13), namely
szw1 =
qw0
2
+
(1− ρ) ε1
4
.
Hence whether it orders goods or not in period 1, the retailer’s total
expected profit in period 0 is given by
E

(1− sw1 + ε1) sw1 + πout − Pw0qw0 − Tw0

,
which can be rewritten as
d
−d

1−
1
2
qw0

qw0 +
(1− ρ)2 ε21
8

1
2d
dε1 − Pw0qw0 − Tw0.
The FOC yields qw0 = 1 − Pw0, which means that the retailer earns an
expected profit of
E

(1− Pw0)2
2
+
(1− ρ)2 ε21
8

− Tw0.
Since the manufacturer will use Tw0 to capture the retailer’s total expected
profit, including the πout that the retailer retains in period 1, the manufac-
turer thus maximizes
max
Pw0
(Pw0 − c) (1− Pw0) +E

(1− Pw0)2
2
+
(1− ρ)2 ε21
8

+
d
εz
w1

(1− c+ ρε1)2
4
+ c(qw0 − sw1)− πout

1
2d
dε1
where the first line corresponds to the manufacturer’s expected profit in
period 0. The second line represents the expected profit that can be ex-
tracted from the retailer in period 1, given that an order is placed only if
the realization of demand in period 1 is higher than εzw1. The FOC is
− (Pw0 − c)−
1
2
d
εz
w1

c− Pw0 −
(1 + ρ) ε1
2

1
2d
dε1 = 0
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Solving this FOC, we have
Pw0 = c+

3
2
−
√
2

d (1 + ρ) .
This implies
qw0 = 1− c−

3
2
−
√
2

d (1 + ρ) .
Using this solution in the expression of εzw1, we find that ε
z
w1 = −

3− 2
√
2

d
for any value of ρ. Thus, if ε1 < ε
z
w1, the retailer does not order any inven-
tory in period 1 (qw1 = 0); and if ε1 > ε
z
w1, the retailer orders
qw1 = (1 + ρ)

3− 2
√
2

d+ ε1
4
.
We can now obtain (15) and (14).
Finally, notice from (14) that sw1 > 0, if d <
(1−c)
[(2−
√
2)−(
√
2−1)ρ]
, which
also guarantees that there is no stockout in period 1 (i.e. qw0 > sw1) and
that sw2 > 0. Next, consider the implicit assumption that the retailer sells
all inventory in period 2 so that sw2 = qw1 + qw0 − sw1, which requires that
MR2 > 0. If ε1 > ε
z
w1, we have sw2 =
1−c+ρε1
2 , so that MR2 > 0 provided
that d < c; if ε1 < ε
z
w1, we have s
z
w2 =
1−c−( 3
2
−
√
2)d(1+ρ)
2 −
(1−ρ)ε1
4 , so that
MR2 > 0 provided that d <
c√
2+ρ(
√
2−1)
. It is easy to check that these
inequalities are satisfied under Assumption (A2).
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